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‘IS UK BUILDING REGULATION GUIDANCE ON SERVICE 
PENETRATIONS ADEQUATE IN RELATION TO COMBUSTIBLE WALL 
OR FLOOR CONSTRUCTIONS?’ 
 
A. Dr Bill Hay, Glasgow Caledonian University, UK 




Technical guidance to the Building Regulations within the countries which make up the United Kingdom 
(UK) permits services of limited diameter, including plastic waste pipes, to penetrate fire resistant wall or 
floor constructions without protection other than fire-stopping the annular space around the penetration.   
Within the UK, Scotland is singular in additionally limiting the number of pipes and the spacing between 
pipes within a grouping in close proximity.  When this guidance was first introduced in Scotland the 
permissible use of combustible forms of constructions was less common than it is today. Additionally in 
the intervening period engineered timber products such as timber I-joists, which may comprise thinner 
section sizes than traditionally sawn joists or studs, have been introduced to the UK construction market. 
If it is the case that charring of structural members, which comprise timber I-joists, takes place within a 
construction cavity as a consequence of unprotected service penetrations, then premature local failure 
could result. Such failure would undermine the fire resistance of the construction, potentially 
endangering building occupants and also pose a danger to fire-fighters. 
 
Three reduced scale fire resistance tests were carried out upon combustible floor constructions, 
containing timber I-joists, which were penetrated by unprotected waste pipes. All of the pipe 
arrangements would be acceptable in terms of building regulation guidance in Northern Ireland, England 
and Wales; whilst only one of the arrangements would adhere to the Scottish guidance. In all instances 
temperatures recorded within the construction cavities were indicative of charring of timber members 





List of Acronyms 
 
ABS Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene 
LVL    Laminated Veneered Lumber 
OSB    Oriented Strand Board 




In many countries, technical guidance relating to 
building regulation requires that fire resistant 
construction be used in specific positions in 
buildings. Concurrently, many European 
Governments consider the increase in timber 
utilisation in the construction of buildings as a 
significant factor in the emission reduction of 
greenhouse gases [1].  The technical guidance in 
Scotland currently indicates more areas where 
combustible fire resistant constructions are 
permissible than was the case in the past. Often 
such construction consists of a combustible timber 
frame clad with gypsum plasterboard. 
 
Functionality dictates that on occasion such 
construction requires to be penetrated by services 
such as drainage or waste pipes. 
 
In order that fire or the products of combustion do 
not penetrate or bypass such fire rated 
constructions, via drainage or waste pipes, such 
pipes are commonly fitted with intumescent 
collars at the point of incursion. Upon heating, 
these collars expand, sealing any potential route 
for gases or flames. However, building regulation 
guidance in the UK permits plastic waste pipes of 
limited diameter to penetrate such construction 
without protection, other than fire-stopping the 
annular space around the pipes. Scotland is 
singular within the UK in specifying a maximum 
number of such pipes and a minimum distance 
between adjacent pipes, within close proximity.  
Although practically the circumstance of multiple 
pipe penetrations in close proximity may be 
unusual, it is nevertheless permissible. 
 
One aspect of timber, and timber board products, 
behaviour in relation to fire is the formation of a 
char layer at the surface, a heated zone below the 
char layer and a relatively unaffected residual 
section of timber below the heated zone.  The 
dimension of this unaffected residual timber 
section influences the ability of a timber framed 
construction to maintain its load-bearing function 
during a fire.  As some engineered timber products, 
such as timber I-joists, have relatively slender 
component parts, when directly exposed to fire 
they may not perform as well as solid sawn timber 
joists due to charring [2].    
 
If it is the case that flames or hot gases could 
invade a construction cavity via groups of small 
diameter pipe penetrations then there is the 
possibility that the structural performance of 
timber members within such a cavity could be 
compromised. This could be exacerbated as a 
temperature increase within the construction 
cavity could also affect the other component parts 
of the construction; both non-combustible 
materials such as gypsum plasterboard, and 
combustible materials such as plywood, 
fibreboard, or particleboard. For example 
dehydration, shrinkage and cracking of gypsum 
plasterboard are related, in part, to its temperature. 
If the gypsum plasterboard protection to such 
constructions is heated from within the 
construction cavity, as well as from the fire 
exposed face, ‘fall-off’ of the gypsum plasterboard 
may occur sooner than would be the case if the 
heating was from one side only. Early failure of 
the gypsum plasterboard would result in early 
direct exposure of the structural members to the 
fire and hence earlier failure of the construction 
locally would be expected.   
 
2.  BUILDING REGULATION GUIDANCE 
 
2.0 PERFORMANCE BASED REGULATION 
 
Currently the building regulations in the countries 
which comprise the UK are performance based. 
Rather than a prescription of what must be done, 
the regulations set functional standards which 
must be met. This allows a degree of design 
flexibility. There are however also guidance 
documents available which prescribe ways of 
meeting the functional standards. Designers are at 
liberty to either use such guidance documents or 
propose alternative solutions which nevertheless 
meet the functional standard. Commonly building 
designers do choose to follow the prescriptive 
guidance.  Although, in cases of disagreement, it is 
ultimately up to the courts to decide if compliance 
with the building regulations has been achieved, 
the guidance documents are critically important, 
offering the most certainty and best defence when 
claiming compliance [3].  
 
2.1 ENGLAND  
 
The guidance documents to the building 
regulations in England are ‘Approved Document 
B, Vol. 1 and 2’ [4] [5]. In relation to pipe 
penetrations these set out provisions of acceptable 
pipe materials and diameters for different 
situations; depending on both the installation 
position and whether or not proprietary sealing 
systems or sleeves are proposed. Where no 
proprietary sealing system is proposed pipes of 
any material and of a nominal internal diameter 
not exceeding 40mm may penetrate fire separating 
elements. There is no stipulation concerning the 
number of pipes, other than that they should be as 
few as possible, nor is there a requirement of a 
minimum spacing between adjacent pipes. There 
is a condition that fire-stopping should be 
provided around the pipe and that the pipe opening 
should be kept as small as possible. 
 
2.2 WALES  
 
Approved Document B, Vol.1 and 2, is also 
applicable in Wales, although incorporating some 
amendments which apply solely to Wales. 
However in relation to pipe penetrations the 
guidance is the unchanged. 
 
2.3 NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
‘Technical Booklet E’ [6] the guidance document 
to the building regulations in Northern Ireland 
gives the same guidance as that in ‘Approved 




In Scotland the guidance documents to the 
building regulations are the ‘Domestic and Non-
Domestic Handbooks’ [7] [8]. These notably vary 
from the guidance in the rest of the UK with 
regard to unprotected service penetrations. Whilst 
there is still an allowance that a pipe with a bore or 
diameter of not more than 40 mm may penetrate a 
fire resisting construction, there are additional 
limits on both the number of such pipes in close 
proximity and also the distance between these 
pipes. Not more than four 40 mm diameter pipes 
are recommended in a grouping and these should 
be at least 40 mm apart and at least 100 mm from 
any other pipe. Alternatively there is the provision 
that more than four 40 mm diameter pipes may be 
provided as long as they are at least 100 mm apart, 
implying that any number of such penetrations 
would be acceptable. 
     
The basis for these allowances in Scotland may be 
traced to an amendment to the Scottish Building 
Regulations in 1973. This amendment allowed 38 
mm diameter pipes to remain unprotected and 
limited the number of pipes.  Initially the spacing 
provision was up to three pipes each 38mm apart, 
or a closely packed group of four pipes were 
permitted as long as they were 100mm distant 
from any other pipe. These parameters were 
amended in 1990 [9] and remain virtually identical 
at the time of writing.   
 
A limited literature review revealed that these 
allowances of unprotected service penetrations are 
not common to North America, Australia or New 
Zealand.  
 
3. TIMBER AND BOARD PRODUCTS 
 
When heated to 100°C free moisture contained in 
timbers cell structure starts to vaporize [10] some 
evaporating from the surface and some migrating 
further into the timber and re-condensing [11] 
[12].  Where the water re-condenses, the moisture 
content can be up to 30%, approximating the fibre 
saturation point of some species; a point at which 
strength and stiffness are both reduced [13].   
 
Between 200 and 450°C timber undergoes thermal 
degradation known as pyrolysis, when it 
decomposes to form volatile gases and char [14].    
These gases migrate to the surface and react with 
oxygen, leading to a release of heat.  This induces 
further pyrolysis and combustion reactions [15].  
Between 225 and 275°C the gases given off can be 
ignited by a pilot flame and burn with a visible 
flame, above 300°C char is formed and between 
350-360°C ignition will occur with the presence of 
a small pilot flame or spark [16].  BS EN 1995-1-
2:2004 [17] states that the char line should be 
taken as the 300°C isotherm.   
 
When and if ignition takes place depends on: the 
proportion of oxygen and the volatile gases given 
off and their mixing, whether ignition is automatic 
or piloted and the mode of heating.  Babrauskas  
[18] found piloted ignition required a temperature 
of between 210 and 497°C and between 200 and 
510 °C for auto ignition. 
 
White and Dietenberger [19] specify OSB as 
having an ignition temperature of 326°C, whilst 
Babrauskas [20] specifies 364°C.  The ignition 
temperatures given by Quintere [21] for plywood 
and particleboard are 390°C and 412°C 
respectively. 
 
Babrauskas [18] states that panel products such as 
plywood or particleboard have ignition properties 
very similar to solid wood.   
 
When heated, the mechanical properties of timber 
change. BS EN 1995-1-2:2004 [17] indicates a 
reduction in modulus of elasticity, and a reduction 
in strength in compression, tension and shear with 
increased temperature.  These reductions in 
strength and stiffness are at temperatures below 
that at which charring might be expected.   
 
Char has no strength or stiffness and the heated 
zone below the char has reduced strength and 
stiffness, therefore the load-bearing capacity of 
timber depends on the residual section size of 
unheated wood.  BS EN 1995 1-2:2004 [17] 
discounts up to a further 7 mm below the char 
layer when using the ‘reduced cross-section’ 
method for the structural analysis of residual 
strength,  to allow for this heated layer. 
 
The temperature and moisture content at any 
particular point in a timber member will depend 
on the temperature gradient within the member.  
This in turn will depend on the heat flux the 
timber or board is exposed to, the thermal 
conductivity which will change dependent on 
moisture migration and the time of exposure. 
 
BS EN 1995-1-2:2004 [17] gives guidance on 
charring rates of timber, LVL and board products, 
but points out that charring rates in a standard fire 
differ depending on the protection to the timber 
member.  Two different notional charring rates are 
given for timber and LVL; one accounting for two 
dimensional heating, the other not.  The charring 
rates given for panels are only for one dimensional 
heating. It notable that the charring rates given for 
board products such as OSB and plywood are 
greater than for solid timber or LVL. There are 
three conditions considered: surfaces unprotected 
throughout the time of fire exposure, surfaces 
initially protected prior to failure of the protection, 
and initially protected surfaces after the failure of 
the protection.  The charring rates after protection 
failure are greater than the situation where there 
was no initial protection, until the char depth 
reaches 25 mm when the rate of charring reverts to 
that of an initially unprotected member. 
  
The problem with historical data on charring rates 
found in the literature, as pointed out by Friquin 
[16], is the variation in test conditions and 
methods, wood species and methods of 
measurement. The charring rates given in BS EN 
1995-1-2:2004 [17] relate to exposure to a 
standard fire.   
 
4. POTENTIAL HEAT TRANSFER 
 
Plastic service pipes can melt and ignite relatively 
quickly when directly exposed to fire.  Where such 
pipes traverse a fire rated wall or floor, a hole may 
be left in the fire exposed side of the construction.  
Choi [22] proposed a number of potential failure 
modes by which flames or hot gases could travel 
from the exposed to the unexposed side of such a 
construction: flame propagation along the pipe 
surface; the combustion of un-burnt volatile gases 
emerging from an open pipe end on the unexposed 
side; or the melting of the pipe on the unexposed 
face, again releasing volatile gases. 
 
Some plastics melt and char when heated; 
subsequent pipe deflection can lead to self-sealing 
of the penetration [23].  However as  Choi [22] 
points  out, if  a  plug  of  char  forms,  it  may  
subsequently disintegrate  under continuous fire 
exposure. 
    
If the pipe remained intact on the unexposed face 
of the construction, with hot gases flowing 
through it, the pipe temperature would rise.  
Initially such a rise may exceed limits designed to 
stop fire spread by conduction, ultimately though 
the temperature may reach a level suitable for 
piloted or auto-ignition of the plastic pipe itself.  
Where plastic pipes pass through cavities in a 
construction, there is the additional possibility of 
flames, hot gases and smoke entering these 
cavities. 
 
One aspect identified as important in relation to 
the performance of plastic pipe penetrations 
passing through constructions is whether or not the 
end on the unexposed face is sealed, for example 
where a pipe terminates at a water trap. Research 
indicates that pipes with sealed ends on the 
unexposed face performed better than those with 
open ends. Attwood [24] attributed this to a 
‘cushion of stagnant air’ in the pipe when the end 
is sealed, which limits the temperature rise within. 
 
If a timber framed wall or floor is not penetrated 
by services the heat transfer in a fire would be first 
to the surface by radiation and convection from 
either the flame or the hot products of combustion. 
Thereafter heat will be transferred through the 
gypsum plasterboard ceiling or wall lining by 
conduction. The cavity and structural members 
will then be heated both by radiation and 
convection from the rear face of the gypsum 
plasterboard and heated gases in the construction 
cavity, and also by conduction where the member 
comes into contact with the rear of the gypsum 
plasterboard. 
 
With the addition of unprotected plastic pipe 
penetrations additional thermal energy may be 
introduced into the construction cavity.   
 
In the early stages of heating before the pipe 
distorts or melts, heat transfer from the pipes 
would be by radiation to the sides of the adjacent 
structural members, underside of the flooring and 
rear face of the gypsum plasterboard. Additionally 
where the gypsum plasterboard and particleboard 
flooring are in contact with the pipe walls there 
will be heat transfer by conduction. 
 
If the pipes in the cavity subsequently soften and 
distort, the ratio of heat transfer mechanisms 
would change and with it the rate of heat transfer.  
If there is a gap around the distorted pipe, this 
would allow gases from the fire to enter the cavity 
thereby increasing gas temperatures. This in turn 
would lead to heating by convection and radiation 
to the sides of the structural members from the gas 
in the cavity.   Additionally there may be some 
radiation through such a gap. If this distortion 
leads to the pipe directly touching the timber 
member there will also be conduction 
 
Assuming a flow of gas is maintained through the 
pipes then they will heat up on the outside face by 
conduction.  The exterior face of the pipes would 
then radiate heat both in the cavity and on the 
unexposed face of the construction. 
 
5. FIRE TESTS 
 
5.0 TEST SAMPLE DESIGN 
 
Three reduced scale fire resistance tests were 
conducted on 2 m x 2 m floor samples. The floor 
samples consisted of 18 mm flooring grade 
particle board on 195 x 45 mm timber I-joists at 
400 mm centres. The I-joists comprised 45 mm x 
47 mm softwood flanges at the top and bottom, 
connected to each other by a 9 mm thick OSB web. 
The underside of the I-joists was lined with a base 
layer of 19 mm gypsum wallboard and a further 
layer of 12.5 mm gypsum wallboard. This 
specification was identified within an I-joist 
manufacturers technical manual as one providing 
60 minutes fire resistance [25]. In all cases the 
samples contained both a construction cavity 
which was penetrated by plastic waste pipes and a 
control cavity with no penetrations. Figure 1 
shows a section through the construction. The 
plastic pipes were positioned a nominal 2 mm 
away from the adjacent structural member. In all 
cases the plastic pipe material used was ABS. The 
pipe penetrations were tightly fitted within the 
apertures in the particle board flooring and 
gypsum plasterboard. The minimal annular space 
around the pipe penetrations remaining were then 
sealed with inert gypsum based plaster filler; this 
type of fire-stopping material being permissible in 
the guidance to the Building Regulations.  
 
The time/temperature curve followed during the 
test was that of a BS 476-20:1987 test; variations 
from the standard curve during the tests were 
within the permitted tolerances [26]. As the tests 
were at a reduced scale it was not possible to load 
the samples.  Monitoring took place via thermo-
couples positioned on the webs of the timber I-
joists adjacent to the pipe penetrations and on the 
I-joist webs in the control cavities. The control 
cavity web was measured in each case by a single 
thermocouple. The test cavity web was measured 
by two thermocouples in test 2 and three 
thermocouples in tests 1 and 3. The data presented 
represents only the control cavity thermocouple 
measurements and the highest single thermocouple 





                   
                   
          Figure 1: Section through Floor Sample
 
5.1 FIRE TEST 1 
 
In test 1 the number and spacing of pipe 
penetrations in the test cavity followed the 
guidance to the Scottish Building Regulations 
explicitly: four 40mm diameter pipes each 40 mm 
apart.  
 
Figure 2 indicates the web temperatures to the I-
joist adjacent to the pipe penetrations and the web 
temperature measured in the control cavity.   
 
 
Figure 2: Web Temperatures Test 1 
 
It may be seen from the graph that the web 
temperature in the cavity without service 
penetrations exceeds 100°C between 50-51 
minutes and therefore would have been subject to 
some moisture migration. The maximum 
temperature of 164°C was reached by the end of 
the 60 minute test period. Therefore the 
temperatures associated with pyrolysis, ignition or 
charring was not reached. 
  
By contrast, the thermocouple to the web 
immediately adjacent to the pipe penetrations in 
the test cavity exceeded 100°C after 10 minutes 
indicating the start of moisture migration. It 
subsequently reached 200 °C at 18-19 minutes; 
indicative of pyrolysis.  250°C was reached at 22 
minutes, potentially conducive to ignition in a 
glowing mode.  300°C was reached at 29-30 
minutes indicative of charring and at the bottom of 
the range identified for piloted direct flaming 
ignition. The top of this range for piloted flaming 
combustion ignition, 365°C, was reached at 41-42 
minutes. 
 
It was also observed that flaming combustion of 
the pipes themselves took place on the unexposed 
face of the floor construction outwith the furnace, 
prior to test termination. 
5.2 FIRE TEST 2 
 
The second test varied from the building 
regulation guidance in Scotland in that an 
additional pipe penetration was introduced; five 
40mm diameter pipes each 40 mm apart. This 
would follow the guidance for the rest of the UK. 
 
Unfortunately the thermocouple to the control 
cavity I-joist web malfunctioned during this test 
and therefore a direct comparison between the 
control and test cavities was not possible. 
However a post-test examination of the I-joists 
from the control cavity confirmed that the web, 
although discoloured, was not charred. 
  
With reference to Figure 3 it may be seen that the 
web to the I-joist in the test cavity reached 100°C 
between 4-5 minutes indicating the start of 
moisture migration; 200°C between 7-8 minutes, 
indicative of pyrolysis; 250°C between 9-10 
minutes, potentially conducive to ignition in a 
glowing mode; 300°C between 14-15 minutes 
indicative of charring; and 365°C between 27-28 




Figure 3: Web Temperature Test 2 
 
As in Test 1 it was observed that that flaming 
combustion of the pipes themselves took place on 
the unexposed face of the floor construction 
outwith the furnace, prior to test termination. This 
occurred sooner in Test 2 than in Test 1. 
 
 
5.3 FIRE TESTS 3    
 
The final test contained four 40mm diameter pipes 
each spaced 20 mm apart. This is at variance with 
the Scottish guidance to the building regulations 
but, as in Test 2, would follow the guidance in the 
rest of the UK. 
 
The web temperature in the control cavity 
exceeded 100°C at 45 minutes, indicating the start 
of moisture movement in the OSB board and 
exceeded 200°C at 59-60 minutes indicating 
potentially the start of pyrolysis.   
 
 
Figure 4: Web Temperatures Test 3 
 
The I-joist web in the test cavity reached 100°C 
between 8-9 minutes indicating the start of 
moisture migration; 200°C between 10-11 minutes, 
indicative of pyrolysis; 250°C between 11-12 
minutes, potentially conducive to ignition in a 
glowing mode; 300°C also between 11-12 minutes 
indicative of charring and 365°C between 19-20 
minutes, the top of the range for piloted flaming 
combustion ignition. 
 
Again, as in Tests 1 and 2, flaming combustion of 
the plastic pipe penetrations on the unexposed face 
outwith the test furnace were observed. This 
occurred sooner than in either of the two previous 
tests. 
 
The experiments indicate that in each case web 
charring and ignition of the timber I-joist in the 
test cavity took place, whereas no charring or 
ignition of the web occurred in the control cavities. 
In all three experiments post-test examination 
showed that the test cavity web had charred 
through its entire thickness. It should be pointed 
out however, that due to the nature of the test 
furnace arrangement, extinguishment of the floor 
samples did not take place until approximately 
four minutes after the furnace was turned off.  
 
Additionally it was evident that in all cases the 
degree of gypsum plasterboard ‘fall-off’ was 
greater to the test cavities than the control cavities. 
         
   
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
To re-iterate; the perceived potential problem with 
current building regulation guidance in relation to 
unprotected service penetrations is that these may 
lead to a rise in temperature within the 
construction. If the construction contains 
engineered timber products with relatively modest 
section sizes, such as I-joists, charring associated 
with such increases in temperature could 
prematurely undermine the load-bearing capacity 
of the construction. Additionally a rise in 
temperature in the construction cavity could 
exacerbate the situation by contributing to 
premature failure of the gypsum plasterboard 
protection. Consequently the fire resistance of the 
overall construction could be reduced as compared 
to an un-penetrated construction. 
  
The rates of charring given in BE EN 1995-1-
2:2004 [17] relate to exposure to a standard fire. 
Prior to ‘fall-off’ of the gypsum plasterboard 
protection, it was not possible to estimate the 
charring rate of the structural member. It was 
however possible to estimate when charring 
commenced, and to compare this with the control 
cavities. 
 
The data indicates that charring could potentially 
occur earlier in a construction cavity which has 
groups of pipes penetrating, than a similar cavity 
without pipe penetrations. Additionally the data 
also signifies that moisture migration, pyrolysis 
and ignition are also likely to occur earlier in a 
penetrated cavity. These facets may be more 
pertinent in constructions containing structural 
members with relatively thin section sizes, such as 
timber I-joists, than those containing traditional 
rectangular sawn joists or studs.  
 
It is also worthy of note that the time/temperature 
history for the web temperatures in test 1 indicate 
better performance than those in tests 2 or 3, 
suggesting that the limitation on spacing or 
number of pipe penetrations unique to Scottish 
Building Regulation guidance is material. 
The main limitation of the research discussed here 
was that the fire tests were at a reduced scale. This 
is pertinent as the volume of the construction 
cavity, which is a function of joist depth, span and 
the joist spacing, will have an effect on the rate at 
which the void increases in temperature. 
Additionally at reduced scale it was not possible to 
load the floor sample and as such the effects of 
deflection were excluded.  
 
Although these experiments are indicative of a 
potential problem with building regulation 
guidance regarding unprotected service 
penetrations, further fire resistance tests require to 
be carried out which better represent realistic 
spans and loadings.       These tests should utilise a 
full sized furnace and include loading of the floor 
specimens in order to determine whether failure 
would actually occur.   
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